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We live in a period of enormous political, economic, and social
change as the United States, together with other industrialized
nations, rushes headlong into a postindustrial, interdependent, infor-
mation-based age.' These changes are driven largely by applications
of computer and telecommunications technology that have permitted
more communications at greater speeds and over longer distances,
virtually shrinking the globe. Indeed, the merging of data-process-
ing and communications technologies has allowed, enhanced, and
accelerated global interdependence on both a geopolitical and
macroeconomic level. This marriage has also created another kind
of technology, information technology, whose value is greater than
the aggregate value of its constituent parts and around which a new
industry is burgeoning.
The meaning of the word information is broadening. The word
information no longer refers only to conventional bodies of statistics,
facts, academic knowledge, scientific data, and daily news. Its mean-
ing now comprehends the electronic sensing and computer analysis
of the human heartbeat, the electronic impulses that measure physi-
cal phenomena in outer space or beneath the sea, and the numeric
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1. The International Business Machines Corporation. one of the world's largest
information providers, described the new age in a recent advertisement:
Information: there's growing agreement that its the name of the age we live in.
[.I e have entered a new era, a post-industrial stage of development in
which the ability to put information to use has become critical, not only to the
essential production of goods, but to efforts to provide a better life for the indi-
vidual, as well.
FORTUNIE, July 1977, at 42-43. The American Telephone and Telegraph Company and
the Xerox Corporation, among others, have employed similar advertising strategies. See,
e.g., id, Feb. 25, 1980, at 154; id, Oct. 22, 1979, at 101.
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digits that record airplane reservations or transfer funds to and from
bank accounts. No matter how they are recorded and stored,
whether on film, paper, or magnetic tapes, whether in books,
magazines, instruction manuals, movies, videotape, or electronic
computer memories, all data are part of this growing information
industry.
We depend increasingly on these various forms of information
for the growth and health of the economy, the smooth functioning of
institutions, and -the quality of our individual lives. Information has
become a marketable, transferable, exportable commodity-a com-
modity whose production, sale, and consumption engage more and
more of us every day.2 This is not strictly a domestic phenomenon.
West Germany, Japan, France, and other industrialized countries
are experiencing and analyzing the same trends. By ascertaining the
probable impact of new information technologies and assessing the
need for increased governmental intervention, the governments and
industries of these countries are attempting to accomodate and foster
the orderly introduction of this technology. Nonetheless, the inevita-
bility and the Velocity of the change resulting from the introduction
of new information technologies have created serious insecurity for
the developed and the developing nations alike.
This article uses a relatively new word, teleinformatics, to refer
to the confluence of telecommunications and computer technologies
and its pervasive economic, social, and political implications.
Teleinformatics is still conceptually nascent and, considering its sig-
nificance, governed by surprising contradiction and ambiguity.
3
Rapid technological development has not only outstripped the
existing legal framework. It has also widened the gulf between soci-
ety's recognition of the occurrence of change and its ability to under-
stand the impact of change. The results are a vast wasteland of
misconception and misunderstanding and a growing legal vacuum.
4
2. By some estimates, the production, processing, and distribution of information
goods and services are responsible for nearly one half of the United States gross national
product and for an equal share of the nation's wages. N.Y. Times, July 8, 1977, at Al,
col. 1; id at 10, col. 1.
3. Even the vocabulary created to describe the phenomenon is cumbersome. The
terms informatics, informatique, telematique, communications, and others have beer,
devised, but no two of these terms convey the same meaning.
4. Information technology's tendency to outstrip the law is not an entirely new
quality. Decisional law often trails a half step behind change, because it tends to rely on
prevailing custom for guiding principles and because of the limitations of stare decisis.
H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 138-39, 427-69, 565-620 (tent. ed. 1958). International customary
law has similar and severer limitations. See . BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 4-12 (3d ed. 1979).
Although teleinformatics issues demand speedy resolution, developments in informa-
tion technology have been too sweeping and too rapid to give rise to generally accepted
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Data protection laws, telecommunications -tariffs and protocols,
and informatics plans have arisen around the world. In an effort to
accomodate the real and potential impact of an unrestrained global
market for information goods and services, individual nations and
their subdivisions have adopted these measures without adequate
international and even domestic consultation and coordination.
There is clearly a movement worldwide toward significantly
expanded regulation of commercial and personal information,
accompanied by controls on the export and import of all kinds of
information and by constraints on the use of technology for the col-
lection, storage, use, and dissemination of data. Nonetheless, on the
international level at least, the lack of coordination begs confusion
and even chaos.
Information has become a valuable resource with political,
social, and cultural implications. Many governments recognize this
and are considering policies to protect or promote their national
interests. Some have drawn analogies between the information and
industrial revolutions that invariably conclude that only the effective
and prompt exploitation of information resources and technology
will assure a nation a place in the so-called new international eco-
nomic order and preserve national autonomy.
5
The Intergovernmental Bureau for Informatics (IBI)6 defines
informatics as "the rational and systematic application of informa-
tion to economic, social and political development."7 In practice,
this means a carefully crafted national plan governing computer and
telecommunications developments to serve the needs and further the
aspirations of the individual nation-state. Brazil, for instance, uses
the term informatics to describe information policies designed in
principles. Some countries have responded with comprehensive statutes. See notes 29-
75 infra and accompanying text. But this approach is also faulty. Its anticipatory and
prophylactic regulatory machinery can stifle the creative and beneficial aspects of infor-
mation technology.
5. See, eg., note 111 infra.
6. The IBI was created under the auspices of the United Nations, E.S.C. Res. 394
(XIII), 13 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1) 50, U.N. Doc. E/518 (1951); E.S.C. Res. 318 (XI),
11 U.N. ESCOR, Supp. (No. 1) 50, U.N. Doc. E/411 (1950); E.S.C. Res. 160 (VII), 7
U.N. ESCOR, Resolutions July 19-Aug. 29, 1948, U.N. Doc. E/966; E.S.C. Res. 22 (III),
3 U.N. ESCOR, Resolutions Sept. I l-Dec. 10, 1946, U.N. Doc. E/233 (1946), and the
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
UNESCO Res. 2.24, UNESCO 6C/Resolutions 22 (1951).
The organization provides assistance to developing countries in the application of
information technology and serves increasingly as a forum for the discussion of informa-
tics policies. HousE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, INTERATIONAL INFORMATION
FLOWS: FORGING A NEW FRAMEWORK, H.R. REP. No. 1535,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29
(1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 House Report]. In 1980, the IBI sponsored the Confer-
ence on Transborder Data Flow Policies with participants from sixty-two countries and
fifteen international organizations. 3 TRANSNAT'L DATA REP. No. 3/4, at 17 (1980).
7. Informatics: Its Political Impact, IBI Doc. DG 1-04, at 2 (1980).
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large part to achieve specific economic goals.8 Under one such pol-
icy, Brazil encourages the expansion of its domestic computer and
telecommunications capabilities in part by restricting access to facili-
ties abroad.9
As early as 1977, Louis Joinet, then a magistrate of the French
Ministry of Justice, framed the debate succinctly: "Information is
power," he said, "and economic information is economic power" 0-
a phrase thathas been repeated ad continuum, perhaps ad nauseum,
ever since. According to Joinet, information has economic value,
and the ability to store and process certain types of data may well
give one country political and technological advantages over other
countries. This in turn may lead to a loss of national sovereignty
through supranational data flows." In response to these challenges,
the French rendition of an informatics strategy, coined the tlW na-
hique plan,' 2 outlines broad areas of authority for the National Gov-
ernment, with a special emphasis on the telecommunications aspect
of the new information technologies.13 The various organs of the
8. See Address by Joubert de Oliviera Brizida, Executive Secretary of the Brazilian
Special Secretariat of Informatics, 1980 Intergovernmental Bureau for Informatics Con-
ference on Transborder Data Flow Policies in Rome, Italy (June 23, 1980),printedin 3
TRANSNAT'L DATA REP. No. 3/4, at 32 (1980).
9. Id., printed in 3 TRANSNAT'L DATA REP. No. 3/4, at 32, 33 (1980).
10. Statement by Louis Joinet, Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Devel-
opment (OECD) Symposium on Transborder Data Flows and the Protection of Privacy
in Vienna, Austria (Sept. 20-23, 1977). See also Joinet, Les Aspects Juridques, Economi-
ques et Socdaux des Flux Transfrontires de Donees Personnelles, 1 INFORMATION, COM-
PUTER AND COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 208, 211 (1979).
11. Joinet, supra note 10, at 211. More recently, Alain Madec, a French economist
and Chairman of the French Commission on Transborder Data Flows, argued that
transborder data flows, unless controlled, threaten the decay of the nation-state by mak-
ing it subordinate to multinational organizations and enterprises. Madec, Economic and
Legal-4spects of Transborder Data Flows, in OECD Doc. DST I/ICCP/80.26, at 33, 37
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Madec paper].
12. The French term informatique generally refers to data processing. Simon Nora
and Alain Mine coined the word tMlmatlque to describe the convergence of telecommu-
nications and data-processing technologies. Stratte-McClure, French Telecommunica-
tions.- Digital Technology and the Telematique Program, SUPP. TO ELECTRONIC NEws &
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 13 (1980). See S. NORA & A. MINC, L'INFORMATIZATION DE LA
socI rA 17 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Nora-Minc report]. With the development of the
telkmatique plan, the latter term has come to refer to information policy as well.
In 1976, the President of France commissioned the Inspector General of Finances,
Simon Nora, to investigate the computerization of French society and to make suitable
proposals concerning this matter to the Government. Nora-Minc report, supra, at 3-4.
The resulting report to the French President, the Nora-Mine report, was the catalyst and
the blueprint for the developing t~lematique plan. The report was essentially the first of
its kind in the world. Because it examines both the technology and its effects on matters
of national importance, the report serves as a model for other nations. Moreover, the
report's sometimes startling findings did much to make informatics prominent among
public issues. The report forecasts, for instance, a thirty percent reduction, possibly
within one decade, in the number of jobs provided by France's insurance and banking
industries. Id at 36.
13. See, e.g., Bus. WEEK, Oct. 1, 1979, at 86.
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French postal and telecommunications agency (PTT)t4 are expected
to implement many of the programs.' 5 The Government has also
established a cabinet level position with responsibility for the full
development of the /z/bmatique concept.
The new office coordinates the activities of governmental organs
whose areas of responsibility overlap and promotes various applica-
tions with its generous budget. 16 As compared with the informatics
plans of other nations, the French program has plentiful resources, a
highly developed focus, and a special urgency. The tlkmatique plan
concentrates on two levels, social and industrial. By promoting the
general computerization of society, the plan will develop the domes-
tic market. Selective trade and telecommunications tariffs and regu-
lations, including the taxation of business information, will allow
France to gain important economic advantages over the United
States in the information market.'
7
In teleinformatics policies, economic issues often obscure
human rights issues. The quantification and taxation of information
transiting international borders are of particular concern. Municipal
and international law have long recognized the importance of pro-
tecting the expression of ideas. Article nineteen of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that "[e]veryone has the
right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes free-
dom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers."1 8 Although the Declaration is not a legal instrument,1 9 it
is part of the fabric of international law20 and is widely understood
14. The European PTTs are state agencies. They generally own the facilities and
regulate the activities of the post and telecommunications.
15. See note 13 supra See generally Stratte-McClure, note 12 supra.
16. See Straffe-McClure, supra note 12, at 5.
17. See generally Id
18. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (111) U.N. Doc. A/810, at
71, art. 19 (1948).
19. Eg., H. LAuTERPAcHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 397-408 (2d
ed. 1968).
20. E.g., L BROWNLIF, supra note 4, at 569-71. Brownlie states that the Declaration
has indirect legal effect in two ways. First, some of the Declaration's provisions consti-
tute general principles of law. Second, the Declaration serves as an authoritative guide
to the interpretation of the United Nations Charter. Id at 571. Article 55 of the Charter
states that "the United Nations shall promote: . . . (c) universal respect for, and obser-
vance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all .... " U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
Article 56 provides that "[a]ll Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate
action in cooperation vith the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth
in Article 55." Id a.,. 56. For a view contrary to that of Brownlie, see H. LAUTER-
PACHT, supra note 19, at 408-14. Lauterpacht also rejects the argument that the Declara-
tion is binding on the organs of the United Nations. Id at 414-17. Lauterpacht ascribes
to the Declaration neither direct nor indirect legal authority, but rather a limited moral
authority. Id at 417-25.
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to be the foundation for the principle of a free flow of information
among nations.
2'
Nonetheless, information has also become a commodity, both as
an intermediate good and as a good of final consumption. The eco-
nomic importance of information in this expanding trade in
intangibles forces us to decide which information should be taxable
and subject to traditional trade restrictions and which information
should be allowed free and open transit to protect the movement of
ideas across national borders.
The IBI has created three international working parties to ana-
lyze the economic and commercial impact of transborder data flows,
data protection and international law, and the international environ-
ment for transborder data flows.22 The discussion in the working
parties' final reports may range from clarification of the protection to
be afforded, certain interests affected by transborder data flows to
suggestions for the regulatory means to achieve this protection.
23
Perhaps most important, the working parties will consider whether a
"universal data protection instrument '2 should be prepared in order
to bring into international uniformity the rights and responsibilities
entailed in transborder data flows.2
21. See, e.g., Address by F.A. Bernasconi, Director General of the Intergovernmental
Bureau for Informatics, 1980 Intergovemmental Bureau for Informatics Conference on
Transborder Data Flow Policies in Rome, Italy (June 23, 1980),printedin 3 TRANSNAT'L
DATA REP. No. 3/4, at 3, 3 (1980); Address by Joubert de Oliviera Brizida, supra note 8,
printed in 3 TRANSNAT'L DATA REP. No. 3/4, at 32, 34 (1980).
The Group of Experts that drafted the Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and
Trausborder Flows of Personal Data for the OECD cites the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49,
U.N. Doc. 6316 (1966), as supporting the principle of a free flow of information. Recom-
mendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy
and Trausborder Flows of Personal Data, OECD Doec. C (80) 58 (Final), app. para. 11(Oct. 1, 1980), reprinted in OECD, GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND
TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA 18 (1981) [hereinafter cited as OECD
Guidelines].
22. International Working Parties on Transborder Data Flow, IBI Doec. TDF 100
(1980). The findings and proposals of the working parties are likely to be controversial.
The IBI wants the working groups to examine growing points of friction between the
countries of the southern hemisphere and those of the northern hemisphere. In particu-
lar, the IBI has asked the working parties to investigate whether the developing countries
are subject to any inequity by having to export unprocessed data in return for little com-
pensation while paying high prices in scarce hard currency for imported processed data.
Id at I. The IBI has also requested the working parties to examine the use of informa-
tion collected by earth-sensing satellites and the institution of regulations requiring
administrative consent before information may be transmitted abroad. Id at 2-3.
23. Id at 2.
24. Id.
25. The IBI suggests that the "problem of balance in information flow" may require
the creation of an international mechanism to regulate transnational information net-
works. Id at 3.
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Alain Madec, Chairman of the French Commission of Trans-
border Data Flows, published an assessment of the economic and
legal aspects of international data flows. 26 Madec presents a system
of information classification that could serve as the basis for, among
other things, the imposition of customs duties and value-added taxes
on transborder data flows.2 7 The United States has also examined
the characteristics of data flows. 28 Unlike the French study, the
United States initiative fulfills an educational function and does not
discuss the possible uses for a system of information classification.
Teleinformatics raises not only commercial issues, but broader
questions of interest to society generally. By undercutting the signifi-
cance of physical distances, for example, global satellite telecommu-
nications may have exacerbated rather than reduced cultural
differences. Charges of electronic colonialism and cultural imperial-
ism are not necessarily masks for economic protectionism. Interna-
tional cultural relations are as old as the flow of people and ideas
across frontiers. Interaction between diverse peoples and cultures,
however, has accelerated dramatically in recent years. Moreover,
the general population's greater participation in world affairs
presents unprecedented opportunities to bring about more coopera-
tion. Nonetheless, it is now evident that neither expanded cross cul-
tural communication nor increased trade necessarily leads to
harmony. Thus, all of these issues present a challenge to policymak-
ers, international business, and the international legal community.
What follows is an attempt to survey the rapidly emerging first
wave of potential barriers to international information flows and the
threat posed to a world already highly dependent on the free flow of
information and the unrestricted use of information technology.
These potential barriers can be divided into five areas: privacy and
data protection laws; telecommunications tariffs, standards, and pro-
tocols; informatics strategies; national responses to computer vulner-
ability; and new links between national sovereignty and information.
Finally, this article examines a recent proposal for the development
of a national information policy in the United States.
26. Madee paper, note 11 Isupra. Madee's assessment and proposals are not an
expression of official French policy. d at 33 n.1.
27. Id at 39-43.
28. U.S. NAT'L TELECOMMUNICATIONS & INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, WORK-
ING PAPER, AN APPROACH TO IDENTIFYING THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES OF
TRANSBORDER DATA FLOW (1980).
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I
PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION
Privacy, or fair information practice as it is known in the United
States, 29 has emerged from a position of total obscurity in just fifteen
years.30 The collection, use, and storage of large volumes of intimate
29. The Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's Advi-
sory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems first coined the term fair informa-
tion practice. SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA
SYSTEMS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND
THE RIGHTS OF CrIzENS xx (1973). The Secretary's Advisory Committee recommended
the enactment of a code of fair information practice that would give legal effect to five
basic principles for the protection of privacy in relation to automated personal data sys-
tems: (I) the existence of no personal data record-keeping system should remain secret;
(2) the individual should have some means of discovering what information about him is
in a record and how it is used; (3) the individual should have some means of preventing
information about him that was obtained for one purpose from being used or made
available for 6ther purposes without his consent; (4) the individual should have some
means of correcting or amending a record of identifiable information about him; and
(5) any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating records of identifi-
able personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended use and must
take precautions to revent misuse of the data. Id at xx-xxi.
The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. III 1979), expanded these five princi-
ples into eight: (1) the existence of no personal data record-keeping system shall remain
secret, and there shall be a policy of openness about an organization's personal data
record-keeping policies, practices, and systems; (2) an individual about whom informa-
tion is maintained by a record-keeping organization in individually identifiable form
shall have a right to see and copy that information; (3) an individual about whom infor-
mation is maintained by a record-keeping organization shall have a right to correct or
amend the substance of that information; (4) there shall be limits on the types of infor-
mation an organization may collect about an individual as well as certain requirements
with respect to the manner in which it collects that information; (5) there shall be limits
on the internal uses of information about an individual within a record-keeping organi-
zation; (6) there shall be limits on the external disclosures of information about an indi-
vidual a record-keeping organization may make; (7) a record-keeping organization shall
bear an affirmative responsibility for establishing reasonable and proper information
management policies and practices that assure that its collection, maintenance, use, and
dissemination of information about an individual is necessary and lawful and that the
information itself is current and accurate; and (8) a record-keeping organization shall be
accountable for its personal data record-keeping policies, practices, and systems. U.S.
PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION
SOCIETY 497-536 (177).
30. The Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (cur-
rent version at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. 11 1979)) was perhaps the first congressional act
relating to privacy protection with respect to the collection and use of personal data. By
opening the records of Federal Government agencies to public inspection, the Freedom
of Information Act establishes a rule in part contrary to the interests of privacy protec-
tion. Thus, some have categorized the Act among those public policy interests that com-
pete with privacy protection. E.g., U.S. PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION,
supra note 29, at 24-26 (1977). On the other hand, by providing the individual with
access to information in governmental records, the Freedom of Information Act, espe-
cially after the enactment of the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. 1111979),
complements privacy protection. E.g., id at 25, 508-12. See also note 29 supra.
The Group of Experts that drafted the OECD Guidelines suggests 1973 as the year
after which OECD member nations generally began to enact privacy and data protection
statutes. OECD Guidelines, supra note 21, at 17.
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information raise fears that technology will be exploited to misuse
personal data. Moreover, on a human rights level, the individual
must be able to discover, correct, and update information about him,
if he is to have some measure of control over information31 used by
third parties in making decisions about him. This need is as pressing
in the United States as it is abroad. The United States has not, how-
ever, pursued privacy protection as avidly and comprehensively as
have other nations (primarily Western European nations).
Several studies completed in the United States, 32 both private
and public, have helped to bring about legislative measures securing
to the individual a right to fair information practice.33 Altogether,
twenty-two nations either have adopted or are in the process of
The 1970 Data Protection Act of the West German State of Hesse was one of the first
laws to address directly the hazards to privacy created by computer technology. Daten-
schutzgesetz vom 7. Oktober 1970, Gesetz- and Verordnungsblatt I S. 625-627 i.d.F. des
Hess. Gesetzes zur Anpassung des Landesrechts an das Einfithrungsgesetz zum
Strafgesetzbuch vom 4. September 1974 (GVBI. I S. 361) Gesetz- und Verordnungsblatt
II 300-10, as cited in DATA PROTECTION LEGISLATION 113-20 (U. Dammann, 0.
Mallmann & S. Simitis eds. 1977). The Hessian statute and an earlier, but defeated Brit-
ish bill, the 1969 Data Surveillance Bill H.C. 1968-1969, vol. I, 627 (1969), became the
focus for the consideration of privacy and data protection in the early 1970's.
31. E.g., note 29 supra. The Secretary's Advisory Committee suggested, however,
that privacy be viewed in a contractual framework. The individual, according to the
Committee, will have to trade some control over information about him in exchange for
the services that a record-keeping organization provides, but bbth parties to the exchange
should participate in setting the terms of the exchange. SECRETARY'S ADVISORY Com-
MITrEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCA-
TION & WELFAREj .supra note 29, at xx. The Privacy Protection Study Commission, for
its part, recommended against extending the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp.
III 1979), to organizations outside the Federal Government. U.S. PRIVACY PROTECTION
STUDY COMMISSION, .wpra note 29, at 497.
32. Eg., L. HARIS & ASSOCIATES INC. & A. WESTIN, THE DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY
(1979); D. PARKER, S. NYCUM & S. ODRA, COMPUTER ABUSE (1973); SECRETARY'S
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, note 29 supra; U.S. NAT'L COMMISSION ON ELEC-
TRONIC FUND TRANSFERS, EFT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1977).
33. On the Federal level, these statutes include the Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. I1 1979); the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 3401-3422 (Supp. III 1979); the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691,
1691b-1691f (1976); the Fair Credit Billing Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-1602, 1610, 1631,
1632, 1637, 1666-1666j (West Supp. 1981); the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1601 note, 1692-1692o (Supp. 11 1978); the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 1681-1681t (West Supp. 1981); and the so-called Buckley Amendment, 20
U.S.C.A. § 1232g (West Supp. 1981). For a list of state statutes relating to privacy pro-
tection, see R. SMITH, COMPILATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRIVACY LAWS 1978-79
(1978).
The ninety-fifth Congress introduced approximately 100 bills addressing privacy pro-
tection. During the ninety-sixth Congress, the Carter administration supported compre-
hensive privacy protection legislation covering medical, research, financial, and
insurance records as well as a measure protecting information held by newsmen. OFFICE
OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, at 15-19 (1979). Congress approved
the latter measure on October 13, 1980. Privacy Protection Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2000aa, 2000aa-5 to -7, 2000aa- 1 to -12 (West Supp. 1981).
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adopting privacy and data protection laws.
34
Although each nation's legislation has its own peculiarities,
some striking similarities exist among the data protection laws of
Western Europe.35 Generally, these laws require the registration or
licensing36 of both private37 and public38 data banks. Some statutes
include manually processed files, but most concentrate on automati-
cally processed files.39 Limitations are often imposed on the length
of time data can be retained,4° and the secondary use, sharing, and
dissemination of data are regulated.4' Rights of access 42 and notice
43
as well as a right to correct incorrect information 44 is created. These
laws generally impose a responsibility for the security and confiden-
tiality of records kept.45 Many Western European laws establish as a
regulatory possibility the requirement of prior authorization for
transmitting data abroad.46 There are sanctions,47 including impris-
onment, 48 for violations. Finally, many Western European countries
have created new national, central authorities responsible for the
administration of their data protection schemes.
49
The global' ground swell of suppoit for individual rights of pri-
vacy is highly credible. Nevertheless, privacy laws, particularly
those taking a comprehensive data protection approach to record
34. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West Ger-
many, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Por-
tugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia. 3
TRANSNAT'L DATA REP. No. 2, at 15 (1980).
35. For a more thorough examination of the data protection laws of Western Europe,
see Eger, Emerging Restrictions on Transnational Data Fows: Privacy Protection or Non-
Tarfff Trade BarriersZ 10 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1055, 1065-78 (1978). See generally F.
HONDIUS, EMERGING DATA PROTECTION IN EUROPE (1975).
36. E.g., the West German Federal Data Protection Act, Bundesdatenschutzgesetz
(BDSG), 1980 BGBI S. 1469, § 19(4). DATA PROTECTION LEGISLATION, supra note 30,
at 70-107, contains an unofficial translation of the West German statutes predecessor,
1977 BGB1 S. 201.
37. E.g., Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG), 1980 BGBI S. 1469, §§ 1(2)2-3, 22, 31.
38. E.g., id §§ 1, 7.
39. The West German statute, for instance, applies to nonautomated files only to a
limited extent. Id § 1.
40. Cf. id § 14(2) (after the accomplishment of the purpose, data may be retained,
but only for scientific purposes and other overriding interests).
41. E.g., id §§ 10, 11, 14(2), 24, 27(2), 32, 35(2), 36 and Annex to § 6(l), at 6.
42. E.g., id §§ 4(1), 13, 26(2), 34(2). Some of these provisions establish rights, others
impose duties.
43. E.g., id §§ 12, 26(1), 34(1). Some of these provisions establish rights, others
impose duties.
44. E.g., id §§ 4(2)-(4), 14, 27, 35. Some of these provisions establish rights, others
impose duties.
45. Eg., id §§ 5, 6, 8.
46. E.g., id §§ 11, 32(3).
47. E.g., id §§ 41-42.
48. E.g., id § 41(1)2, (2).
49. E.g., id §§ 15-21.
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management, will pose serious threats to international commerce if
fully implemented and enforced.
50
Despite a shared point of departure, at least on the manifest
level of human rights, crucial differences exist between the United
States and Western European approaches to privacy protection. In
the United States, privacy legislation is pursued on an incremental,
"as needed" basis.5 1 Other nations have adopted an omnibus
approach.5 2 Similarly, United States privacy laws afford protection
only to individuals or natural persons. In contrast to the United
States, Western Europe continues to press for the coverage of legal
persons,5 3 including corpcrations, associations, and trade unions,
54
even though the inclusion of legal persons raises little-understood
problems in terms of competition, trade secrets, and reduced effi-
ciency.55 Moreover, comprehensive data protection presents West-
ern European governments with administrative problems far
removed from any concern for individual privacy. Because of the
emerging informatics strategies, a permanent shift away from the
protection of individual privacy alone and toward data protection
and the inclusion of a wide range of economic, political, and per-
sonal information seems clear and inevitable.
The Organisation for Economic Development and Co-Opera-
50. Western European data protection laws lay down the same rules for all uses and
disclosures of personal information. Thus, these statutes tend to protect the information
contained in data collections. In contrast to the Western European approach, United
States privacy law tends to protect the individual. For instance, the Privacy Act of 1974,
5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. Ill 1979), allows case-by-case determination whether or not per-
sonal data is private. For a comparison of the two approaches, see 1980 House Report,
supra note 6, at 38-40.
51. 1980 House Report, supra note 6, at 38-39.
52. The West German Federal Data Protection Act, for instance, establishes rela-
tively identical standards for all data bases, both those in the private sector and those in
the public sector. See notes 37-38 supra.
53. In its strict sense, the word privacy does not apply to legal or nonnatural persons.
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NAT'L BuREAu OF STANDARDS, CONTROLLED AccESSIBIL-
rry BIBLIOGRAPHY 2 (1973). The preferred term is confidentiality, and even this word is
used in reference to data, not nonnatural persons. Id
54. The data protection laws of Austria, Denmark, Luxembourg, and Norway pro-
tect information about legal persons as well as information about natural persons. 3
TRANSNAT'L DATA REP. No. 2, at 16 (1980).
55. One spokesman for the United States financial industry, the Chairman of the
Board of Directors of Citibank, argues, however, that protection of the privacy of legal
persons deserves at least as much attention as protection of the privacy of natural per-
sons. He suggests that efforts to protect the privacy of natural persons, at least insofar as
banking records threaten individual privacy, will be ineffectual, unless banks have the
right to protect the confidentiality of their records. Finally, he implies that measures
protecting the privacy of legal persons would not substantially add to the costs of protect-
ing the privacy of natural persons, because information about legal and natural persons
is frequently inseparable. Letter from Walter B. Wriston to U.S. Representative Rich-
ardson Preyer (May 23, 1980) (on file at Cornell International Law Journal).
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tion (OECD),56 the Council of Europe, 57 and the European Commu-
nity (EC),5 8 have all considered policy on privacy and data
protection. The United States has participated in the formulation of
only the nonbinding 59 OECD Guidelines Governing the Protection
of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data.
60
The United States is now actively promoting the OECD Guide-
lines as minimum standards for corporate conduct. 61 Despite the
nonbinding nature of the Guidelines, it is anticipated that their
56. OECD Guidelines, note 21 supra.
57. Convention for the Protection of Individuals With Regard to Automatic Process-
ing of Personal Data, Jan. 28, 1981, Europ. T.S. No. 108 [hereinafter cited as Council of
Europe Convention].
58. The European Parliament's resolution on the Protection of the Rights of the Indi-
vidual in the Face of Technical Developments in Data Processing, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 140) 34 (1979); and the so-called Bayeri Report, on which the resolution is based,
[1979-1980] EUR. PARL. Doc. (No. 100) (1979).
59. The OECD Council "recommends" the OECD Guidelines to the OECD membernations. OECD Guidelines, supra note 21, at 7. Moreover, the document states that its
principles "should" be observed. Eg., id at 10. See id at 27.
60. OECD Guidelines, note 21 supra. Austrilia, Canada, Ireland, Turkey, and the
United Kingdom have abstained from the OECD Guidelines at present. Id at 5 n.1.
61. There are several reasons why United States companies should comply with the
OECD Guidelines. Voluntary adherence to the OECD Guidelines may satisfy those
nations that become signatories to the Council of Europe Convention. If voluntary
adherence proves illusory, these signatory nations may urge the United States to accede
to the Council of Europe Convention. See Council of Europe Convention, supra note 57,
art. 23. The OECD Guidelines do not protect the privacy of legal persons, but the Coun-
cil of Europe Convention permits parties to the Convention to extend the Convention's
scope to include groups, whether they be legal or not. OECD Guidelines, supra note 21,
at 9, 10, 24, 26, 28; Council of Europe Convention, supra note 57, art. 3.2b. A party that
has not made the article 3.2.b extension may not claim the application of the Convention
to groups by a party that has made this extension. Id art- 3.5. By negative implication,
an extending party may require all other parties-whether or not they have themselves
made the article 3.2.b extension--to apply the Convention to transborder data flows con-
cerning groups when these flows originate from the territory of the extending party.
Indeed, an extending party might base this claim simply on the Convention's authoriza-
tion of "extensions." Id art. 3.2.b, .5. The Convention does provide that a party shall
not subject transborder data flows going to other parties to special authorization for the
sole purpose of protecting privacy. Id art. 12.2. Nonetheless, the Convention allows
parties to derogate from the p.inciple of article 12.2, unless the receiving party provides
protection equivalent to that of the transmitting party. Id art. 12.3.a. Thus, the Conven-
tion more or less explicitly permits a party to deny the export of data under certain
circumstances. Finally, the OECD Guidelines recommend that OECD member nations
merely "establish legal, administrative or other procedures or institutions" that will,
among other things, "provide for reasonable means for individuals to exercise their rights
...." OECD Guidelines, supra note 21, at 12. OECD member nations should also
"establish procedures to facilitate.., mutual assistance in the procedural and investiga-
tive matters involved." Id In contrast, the Council of Europe Convention requires par-
ties to designate one or more authorities responsible for mutual assistance. Council of
Europe Convention, supra note 57, art. 13. Moreover, "any person resident abroad"
must have the option of submitting a request concerning information about him to the
designated authority of the territory in which he resides. Id art. 14.1-.2. Thus, the Con-
vention stops short of requiring parties to establish central authorities with responsibility
for privacy and data protection. Nonetheless, the designated authorities may resemble
and may in fact become central authorities with broad powers.
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adoption in spirit will do much to ameliorate or eliminate many of
the concerns other nations express about the security of personal
data that transit United States borders or are processed within the
United States.
When it negotiated the Guidelines, the United States fully rec-
ognized the Western European bias toward anticipatory, prophylac-
tic, and omnibus legislation and the desire of many OECD member
nations to produce a binding treaty. While the OECD was drafting
the Guidelines, the Council of Europe was busy negotiating the Con-
vention for the Protection of Individuals With Regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data.62 The Convention, unlike the OECD
Guidelines, is binding and will assume treaty status following ratifi-
cation by five acceding countries.6 3 The Convention is potentially
far more restrictive than the OECD Guidelines64 and, furthermore,
requires acceding countries to pass implementing legislation.6 5
Only widespread adherence to the OECD Guidelines in the
United States, by her private corporations, and in other non-Euro-
pean countries can demonstrate the necessary commitment to the
principles of privacy protection. The absence of such an affirmation
of sincerity will render the Guidelines' voluntary approach a useless
exercise, and United States multinational corporations may find
restrictive, mandatory codes of conduct, such as the Council of
Europe Convention, their only alternative.
The Council of Europe Convention places restrictions on the
treatment of personal data that are similar to those in the OECD
Guidelines:
Personal data- undergoing automatic processing shall be:
a. obtained and processed fairly and lawfully,
b. stored for specified and legitimate purposes and not used in a way
incompatible with those purposes;
c. adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for
which they are stored;
d. accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date;
e. preserved in a form which permits identification of the data subjects
for no longer than is required for the purpose for which those data are
stored.
66
62. Council of Europe Convention, note 57 supra.
63. Id art. 22.2.
64. See note 61 supra.
65. Council of Europe Convention, supra note 57, art. 4.1.
66. Id art. 5. The "Collection Limitation Principle" in the OECD Guidelines is
comparable to article 5.a in the Convention. OECD Guidelines, supra note 21, at 10.
The "Purpose Specification Principle" in the OECD Guidelines is comparable to article
5.b in the Convention. Id Because it explicitly requires initial specification no later than
the time of data collection and subsequent specification whenever the purpose changes,
the Guidelines' provision is arguably more demanding than the Convention's provision.
The Guidelines' "Data Quality Principle" is comparable to art. 5c-d in the Convention.
1981]
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3 Both the OECD Guidelines and the Council of Europe Conven-
tion apply to the public and private sectors, 67 but the Convention
covers only automatically processed personal data.68 At the time of
signature, however, parties to the Convention may modify the Con-
vention's coverage to include legal persons (and other organizations
such as partnerships) and manually processed files.69 In the same
way, parties may exempt certain classes of files from coverage.
70
Additions and exemptions become reciprocal; thus, a party that
exempts certain records from coverage may not expect the other par-
ties to honor similar records with the provisions of the Convention. 71
With this flexibility, the Council of Europe Convention may in time
closely resemble the OECD Guidelines. More skeptical observers,
however, might perceive this same flexibility as presenting an oppor-
tunity to impose more restrictive and costly regulations.
It is not yet clear whether privacy and data protection laws and
international codes of conduct will become instruments of the new
protectionism. Clearly, some countries may easily design or manip-
ulate their privacy and data protection laws in order to achieve polit-
ical, cultural, avid economic ends unrelated to the protection of
individual privacy.
The EC, which has also considered policy on privacy, has from
the beginning approached transborder flows of all kinds of informa-
tion with economic considerations in mind. Unlike the Council of
Europe and the OECD, whose real intentions may often be veiled in
the negotiating process, the EC has taken direct aim at the capture of
a large share of the global teleinformatics market 72 while noticing
privacy as only a secondary concern. The so-called Bayerl Report
73
Id The data quality principle does not explicitly require data to be not excessive in
relation to the specified purposes, but this might be read into the Guidelines' require-
ments of relevance.
The Guidelines' purpose specification principle requires the use of data to be limited to
specified purposes, id, but there is no provision covering the form in which data is stored
after the accomplishment of these purposes. But cf. id at 30 (the explanatory memoran-
dum notes that,' ..hen data no longer serve a purpose, and if it is practicable, it may be
necessary to have them destroyed (erased) or given an anonymous form."). Finally, both
the OECD Guidelines and the Council of Europe Convention require data controllers to
take security measures for the protection of personal data. Id at 10; Council of Europe
Convention, supra note 57, art. 7.
67. OECD Guidelines, supra note 21, at 9, 27. Council of Europe Convention, supra
note 57, art. 3.1.
68. Council of Europe Convention, supra note 57, art. 3.1. The OECD Guidelines
do not limit their application to automatically processed data. OECD Guidelines, upra
note 21, at 9, 24-27.
69. Council of Europe Convention, supra note 57, art. 3.2.b-c.
70. Id art. 3.2.a.
71. Id art. 3.4. See note 61 supra.
72. WORLD Bus. WEEKLY, Oct. 29, 1979, at 28.
73. [1979-1980] EUR. PARL. Doc. (No. 100) (1979). See also note 58 supra.
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articulates the EC's privacy policy. The report stresses the impor-
tance of harmonizing data protection standards internationally to
avoid placing unnecessary impediments in the way of international
commerce. Of course, the report recognizes the legitimacy of a con-
cern for the protection of individual privacy, but the EC has post-
poned any action until it has considered whether or not it should
supplement74 or accede 75 to the Council of Europe Convention.
The impact of increased privacy regulations and legislation on
teleinformatics issues will be far reaching. It is still unclear in some
cases when the protection of human rights ends and the protection of
national industries begins. The undue inhibition of international
transfers of information will interrupt or obstruct international com-
merce. The line of demarcation between personal privacy and com-
mercial issues became clearer over the past eighteen months,
however, as nations, with France in the lead, began to announce
their national plans for economic prosperity in commercial rather




In contrast to privacy and data protection laws, the implementa-
tion of tariffs, higher standards, differing protocols, and policies lim-
iting the import and use of foreign equipment raises barriers
blatantly economic in nature. These barriers can more directly affect
the cost, management, control, and effectiveness of the information
systems of a multinational corporation.
Louis Pouzin, one of Western Europe's leading systems design-
ers, argues that telecommunications tariffs and regulations have
proved to be the most effective means for preventing the exchange of
information.76 An example is the cost of leased telephone lines in
Western Europe where the price per mile of international lines is
three to five times that of domestic lines.77 According to Pouzin, the
Western European PTTs persistently discourage international com-
74. Letter from Etienne Davignon to the President of the European Parliament (Jan.
16, 1979), reprinted in [1979-1980] EUR. PARL. Doc. (No. 100) Annex III (1979).
75. Resolution on the Protection of the Rights of the Individual in the Face of Tech-
nical Deyelopments in Data Processing, supra note 58, at 36, para. 15.
76. Address of Louis Pouzin in Las Vegas, Nevada (Mar. 6, 1978).
77. Telecommunications regulations may pose barriers to national communications
as well. The sharply divergent long distance telephone rates among Canadian provinces
are an example. CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF TELECOMMUNI-
CATIONS FOR CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY, CANADIAN DEPOT OF COMMUNICATIONS, TELE-
COMMUNICATIONS AND CANADA 27-28 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Clyne Committee
Report].
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minications. 78 The PTTs want more than control; they want reve-
nues from the burgeoning growth in data communications. Thus,
although the user may once have found the PTTs willing to offer
dedicated facilities for lease, so-called private, leased lines, he now
finds these facilities unavailable or available at an ever-increasing
cost.
The leasing of private lines may never have been popular with
the PTTs, but it was a technological necessity, because users' needs
were too sophisticated for the public networks to accomodate. Simi-
larly, charging for private, leased lines on a flat fee basis was not a
matter of choice, rather it arose largely from the need to charge in a
costwise manner. The technical capability to discern what volumes
of data were transiting the lines would have been expensive, leaving
aside the questionable ethical character of the eavesdropping such
monitoring would have required. Nevertheless, even though the
demand for private, leased lines continues to increase, the PTTs'
greater technical sophistication permits them to question what they
have in the past tolerated as a necessary evil.
The PTTs dgue that multinational corporations, with their pri-
vate, leased lines, erode actual and potential revenues for the PTTs
by developing their own international, electronic message systems,
computer-to-computer networks, and other information systems.
These private systems compete directly or indirectly with the existing
telex services offered by the PTTs and with the electronic mail serv-
ices they are rapidly developing.
79
A first step in the elimination of private, leased lines occurred
within the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative
Committee (CCITT). 0 The CCITT is the administrative arm of the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU)81 charged with
responsibility for international telecommunications regulation. At a
78. Address of Louis Pouzin, note 76 supra. Pouzin suggested that the PITs indi-
rectly promote the installation of domestic data-processing facilities by setting high inter-
national tariffs. Id
79. For a description of the competition among the PTTs themselves concerning
their new videotex system, see Clyne Committee report, supra note 77, at 61-62.
80. In reaching its decisions, the CCITT permits each country one vote. The
CCITT's recommendations specify technical and operational confines for international
telecommunications. Because the provision of international telecommunications services
requires international cooperation, service providers generally observe the CCITT's rec-
ommendations, even though they are not legally binding. See generally Jacobson, The
International Telecommunication Union ITU's Structure and Functions, in JOHN &
MARY R. MARKLE FOUNDATION, GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS IN THE SPACE AGE app. C
(1972); Voge, The International Telecommunication Union Its Functions and Structure, in
id app. E.
81. The ITU has 154 member nations and makes its headquarters in Geneva, Swit-
zerland. O'Neill, The International Telecommunication Union, TELECOMMUNICATION,
Feb. 1981, at 25. The organization seeks
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1977 meeting of CCITT Study Group III, the Italian delegation
urged the Group to discourage the introduction of new private,
leased lines.82 The proposal also suggested that the Group study the
possibility of transferring traffic transiting the private, leased lines to
the public networks for tariffing on a volume sensitive basis.83 Per-
haps more important, the Western European PTTs already subject
the private, leased lines of the Society for Worldwide Interbank
Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT)84 to a tariff computed in
part on the basis of volume.8
5
Actions in the United States have further enlarged the contro-
versy over private, leased lines. The Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC) has initiated a proceeding intended to eliminate any
tariff restriction on the resale and shared use of international tele-
communications facilities.8 6 By allowing greater competition in the
provision of telecommunications services, the permissive resale and
a) to maintain and extend international cooperation for the improvement and
rational use of telecommunications of all kinds; b) to promote the development
of technical facilities and their most efficient operation with a view to improving
the efficiency of telecommunications services, increasing their usefulness and
making them, so far as possible, generally available to the public; c) to harmo-
nize the actions of nations in the attainment of those ends.
Id at 26. The ITU began in 1865 as the International Telegraph Union. Id at 25.
Today, it has two main administrative arms, the International Radio Consultative Com-
mittee and the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee. Jacob-
son, note 80 supra. The ITU pursues its goals by sponsoring international conferences
and meetings, publications, exhibitions, and technical cooperation. For a history of the
ITU's conferences, see M. FELDMAN, THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE INTER-
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION AND PRE-ITU CONFERENCES (1976).
82. CCITT Study Group III, Rates for Private Leased Circuits, Doc. COM III-No. 6-
E (Feb. 1977) (Italian Administration). One purpose of the Italian proposal was the
preservation of PTT revenues. Id
83. Id A working group of CCITT Study Group III ultimately rejected that part of
the Italian proposal concerning the provision of new private, leased lines. CCITT Study
Group III, Report on the Meeting Held in Geneva from 1 to 3 May 1978, Doc. COM III-
No. 51-E, at 4 (July 1978) (Working Party III/1). The Working Party is still studying the
proper tariff structure for private, leased lines. Id at 10.
84. In 1973, a group of financial institutions organized SWIFT as a nonprofit, coop-
erative society headquartered in Belgium,. Nacamuli, SWIF7 Objectives, Standardiza-
tion, A4yailabiity, Auditability, Security, Privacy and Liability, 3 TRANSNAT'L DATA REP.
No. 6, at 7, 7 (1980). SWIFT develops and operates an international communications
network to serve the international banking community. Id SWIFT began operating in
1977 and now has nearly 750 members in twenty-seven countries. Id
85. Minutes of the Meeting of Conference of European Postal and Telecommunica-
tions Administrations (CEPT) Study Group "General Principles and Tariffs" (Florence,
Italy Oct. 7, 1975), reprinted in CENTER FOR COMMUNICATIONS MANAGEMENT, INC.,
NEW TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS app. B.
86. Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale & Shared Use of Common Carrier Int'l
Communications Servs., 77 F.C.C.2d 831, 832 (1980).
The FCC defines resale as "an activity wherein one entity subscribes to the communi-
cations services and facilities of another entity and then reoffers the com unications
service and facilities to the public (with or without 'adding value') for profit." Regula-
tory Policies Concerning Resale & Shared Use of Common Carrier Servs. & Facilities, 60
F.C.C.2d 261, 271 (1976), amended on recon., 62 F.C.C.2d 588 (1977), a.f'd sub noam.
220 CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 14:203
shared use of international facilities would wrest control of interna-
tional communications from the PTTs. In their responses to the
FCC proceeding,87 foreign telecommunications administrations have
made clear their opposition. They may eliminate, or increase
sharply the cost of, the private, leased line, if the United States
removes, for its part, the restrictions that prevent the resale and
shared use of facilities communicating traffic internationally.88
From the United States perspective, the FCC initiative is noth-
ing more than an attempt to foster the provision of more varied and
economical international data communications services and to bring
the regulations governing these services in line with those governing
domestic telecommunications.8 9 This attempt to impose a domestic
initiative onto the international market has drawn mixed reactions.
Foreign PTTs and large United States corporate users of telecommu-
nications facilities oppose lifting the restrictions on resale and shared
use. The PTTs want to preserve control. The large corporate users
fear a Western European reaction eliminating the private, leased
lines, on which they depend. Only potential market entrants support
the proceeding. \
Despite corporate dependence on private, leased lines, the trend
is clearly toward reducing, though not eliminating, the availability of
this service both domestically and internationally. Because it would
eventually achieve the same end with less confrontation, the adop-
tion of volume sensitive pricing for private, leased lines may emerge
as a compromise in place of increased restrictions on availability.
A related and equally important dispute concerns access. The
American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17 (2d Cir.), cer. denied, 439 U.S. 875 (1978).
The FCC defines sharing as
a non-profit arrangement in which several users... collectively use communi-
cations services and facilities obtained from an underlying carrier or a resale
carrier, with each user paying the communications-related costs associated with
subscription to and collective use of the communications services and facilities
according to its pro rata usage of such communications services and facilities.
Id at 274. The FCC will apparently apply these two definitions to the international as
well as the domestic context. Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale & Shared Use of
Common Carrier Int'l Communications Servs., 77 F.C.C.2d at 840 n.18.
87. Comments of Western Union Int'l, Inc., F.C.C. Docket No. 80-176, app. C (filed
Aug. 15, 1980).
88. Id at 18-21.
89. See Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale & Shared Use of Common Carrier
Int'l Communications Servs., 77 F.C.C.2d 831, 834-39 (1980); Separate Statement of
Charles D. Ferris, Chairman of the FCC, id at 843-44. For FCC actions regarding the
removal of domestic tariffs restricting resale and shared use, see Regulatory Policies Con-
cerning Resale & Shared Use of Common Carrier Domestic Public Switched Network
Servs., 77 F.C.C.2d 274 (1980); Regulatory Policies Concerning Resale & Shared Use of
Common Carrier Servs. & Facilities, 60 F.C.C.2d 261 (1976), amended on recoin, 62
F.C.C.2d 588 (1977), af'd sub nont American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, 572 F.2d 17 (2d
Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 875 (1978).
TEL EINFORMAL TICS
West German Bundespos190 has recently issued new regulations, 91
effective January 1, 1982,92 that will significantly restrict the extent to
which private leased lines may have access to international lines.
These regulations will present the private user with a choice
between, on the one hand, placing computers in West Germany to
perform significant processing locally before international transmis-
sion and, on the other hand, connection to the new volume sensitive
services offered by the West German PTT.93 "Both alternatives are
expensive and should create havoc for remote computing service
companies that have spent a fortune establishing efficient data trans-
mission methods and large centers . .. [with] huge volumes of
processing 24 hours a day for customers in different time zones
around the world."' 94 there are indications that other foreign coun-
tries intend to follow the West German policy. 95
Protocol and standards present yet another area for concern.
Without compatible protocols and standards, international commu-
nication as well as the introduction and marketing of new computer-
and communications-based products and services such as home
information systems become impossible. The CCITT is the appro-
priate forum for standards determination and will doubtless provide
the arena for major debates on international teletext, videotext,
96
and home information systems.
The United States and Western European standards may vary
for different services, which is a crucial factor in the international
market potential for the United States viewdata industry. Television
standards are an example of this variance. The Western European
90. The Bundespost is the PTT of West Germany.
91. Telegram from American Embassy, Bonn, West Germany, to U.S. Secretary of
State (Apr. 15, 1980) (on file at Cornell International Law Journal).
92. Id
93. See Markoski, Telecommunications Regulations as Barriers to the Transborder
Flow of Information, 14 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 287, 317-19 (1981).
94. DATAMATION, Oct. 1979, at 78.
95. Id Two United States data-processing service organizations, the Control Data
Corporation and Tymshare, Inc., have experienced restrictions in Japan similar to those
in the West German regulations. See International Data Flow: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Government Information and Individual Rights of the House Comm on Govern-
ment Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 34, 47-52, 61, 62-64, 73-76 (1980) (statements of
Philip C. Onstad & Warren E. Burton).
96. The nomenclature for these new and innovative systems is often confused and
contradictory. In most fora, videotex is the generic term for cable or broadcasting sys-
tems that transmit information from-data-banks for display on television screens in the
home or the office. See, e.g., Clyne Committee report, supra note 77, at 61. Within the
general category, teletext is a broadcasting system to which an integrated circuit decoder
can provide access. For examples of the new services these systems permit, see N.Y.
Times, May 4, 1981, at D4, col. 1. These new systems have also spurred a debate over the
limits to which their use should be subject. E.g., Yellow Pages and a Fearful Press, id at
A22, coL 1.
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systems employ a standard with more scanning lines than the United
States usage. This discrepancy could make compatibility extremely
difficult in a future environment of international videotex. The
CCITT has taken up the work of determining international stan-
dards, and the United States has been represented, albeit with mini-
mal governmental and popular support. The importance of the
United States representation stems from the inevitable interrelation-
ships between videotex and computer manufacturers and software
providers. The global development of home information systems
using standards incompatible with the United States standards
would undoubtedly affect the United States data industry.
III
INFORMATICS PLANS
The transborder data flow restrictions and the arbitrary tele-
communications tariffs and regulations of the last few years appear
stopgap and short term when viewed against the more visionary
development of national informatics plans. Broadly stated,
informatics plans harness the essential elements of information
resources in much the same way a nation might approach its coal or
oil. In the name of national interest, informatics plans or strategies
generally encourage the development and robust use of computer
and telecommunications technology. With their nationalism and
inward focus, however, the present informatics plans neglect an ele-
mental factor in the teleinformatics environment: increasing global
interdependence, which in turn, necessitates more harmony and
coordination in the regulation of information and an expanded
exchange of information. Of particular interest to the United States,
France's Nora-Minc report97 raises the issue of potential corporate
(primarily IBM) dominance in national affairs and the need to check
this development.9" More recently, the French economist Madec
also stressed the need diligently to diminish the threat of corporate
influence in the area of teleinformatics in order to maintain national
control over national affairs.99
The Nora-Minc report has provided the French Government
with a solid framework within which to develop its tbldmatique plan.
These are some of the report's recommendations: cooperation
between the PTT and other high technology agencies; 00 concentra-
tion on component technology to the same extent as that accorded
97. Nora-Minc report, note 12 supra.
98. Id at 62-72.
99. Madec paper, supra note 11, at 37.
100. Nora-Minc report, supra note 12, at 12-16.
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nuclear technology, with a recognition of its essential role in main-
taining national independence;' 0 1 the enlargement of the European
supply of basic data in order to diminish dependence upon United
States data banks;10 2 and the construction of a more suitable and
flexible model for the economic analysis of teleinformatics. 0 3 The
implications of this last recommendation merit special attention
from the United States and its teleinformatics industries. Alain
Madec has set the stage for the development of such a system-a
scheme for quantifying, classifying, and logically taxing certain
kinds of data flows.'0 4
Madec recommends an interrelated classification scheme' 05
comprising four parts: a legal classification distinguishing between
public and confidential data; a commercial classification distinguish-
ing saleable information from that which is not, thereby permitting
better regulation of property rights; a functional classification clari-
fying the information carriers' diversified roles as a distributor, a
conduit for two-way communication, or a central nervous system;
and an economic classification defining information in terms of its
contribution to the process of creating a final product. 06
For the United States and others concerned with the right to
trade freely, new economic approaches raise a compelling question:
To what extent can information be detached from its surrounding
circumstances, whether from an author, a place, or an entity whose
101. Id at 62-70.
102. Id at 28.
103. Id at 111-25.
104. According to Madec, just as international trade in goods is not analyzed by
examining solely the packaging or the means of transportation used, neither should econ-
omists limit their analyses of trade in information to the signal or the nature of the trans-
mitting medium employed. Madec paper, supra note I1, at 39. He recommends, instead,
that economists examine the content of data flows and that economic classifications of
data flows take into account the underlying reason for a particular data flow, its useful-
ness, and its value. Id Madec notes that it is increasingly difficult to detect the content
of a data flow during its transmission. Id Thus, he argues that the determination of the
usefulness of data will require an examination of the data at the terminal ends of the
communication circuit:
[I]t is impossible to study data flows without investigating the "stocks" at either
end. Extending our map of data flows to include the geography of stocks is all
the more necessary in that data stocks are at the very origin of new information,
which is rarely acquired directly from the environment, but usually results from
the further processing of existing information. Thus, the stock is closely associ-
ated with the value added by the computer.
Id
105. Id at 39-42.
106. Madee's economic classification established three types of flows: (1) transmis-
sions of straightforward information, eg., messages, books, and television programs, are
final consumption flows; (2) transmissions of data requiring further refinement are flows
of intermediate or semifinished goods; and (3) exchanges of organizational systems, e.g.,
computer software, are flows of capital goods. Id at 40.
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inferests are implicated. 0 7 Already, many countries advocate for a
right to exercise control over any and all information gathered
within national borders.'0 8 The trends shows no signs of diminish-
ing, and these countries are likely to persist as sovereignty and infor-
mation issues become more closely linked. 10 9
The Clyne Committee report" 0 is Canada's answer to the Nora-
Minc report. The Canadian report stresses the threat to national
sovereignty posed by potential national dependence on foreign
nations with advanced telecommunications technology."' When
privacy concerns still dominated the discussion of international com-
munications policies and problems, Hugh Falkner, then Canadian
Minister of Science and Technology, anticipated the present debates
by arguing that the chief problems with transborder data flow lay
elsewhere:
the potential of growing dependence rather than interdependence, the loss of
employment opportunities, in addition to the balance of payments problems,
the danger of loss of legitimate access to vital information and the danger
that industrial and social development will be largel overned by the deci-
sions of interestgroups residing in another ountry.7
The Clyne Committee report addresses each of Falkner's fears.
The report details a slate of recommendations' 3 across a broad spec-
107. Id at 42.
108. See note 22 supra.
109. See notes 166-83 infra and accompanying text.
110. Clyne Committee report, note 77 supra.
111. Id at 1-5, 30-31, 37, 41-42, 52, 54, 57, 60, 63-65, 75-76, 79, 84. The Clyne Com-
mittee report adopted the following definition of sovereignty: "'the ability of Canadians
... to exercise control over the direction of economic, social, cultural, and political
change."' Id at I. This broad definition causes Canadian informatics strategies to over-
lap with other distinguishable concerns, ag., computer vulnerability. See id at 60. See
generaly notes 119-54 infra and accompanying text. Thus, in Canada, it is difficult to
discern where sovereignty ends and informatics begins. The Clyne Committee report,
however, makes the direct link: "[1informatics is a word that is coming into general
international use to describe computer-communications of all kinds. Of all the technolo-
gies that are developing so rapidly today, that of informatics poses possibly the most
dangerous threat to Canadian sovereignty...." Id at 57 (emphasis in original). None-
theless, the report's discussion makes it clear that the Clyne Committee was equally con-
cerned with the straightforwardly economic implications of computer and
communications technology:
[TIhe rich countries in the world today are those that exploited the industrial
revolution in the 19th century; the rich countries of the future will be those that
exploit the information revolution to their own best advantage in the 20th and
21st centuries. The industrial revolution was exploited in Canada at first by for-
eign interests, a fact that has produced our "branch-plant economy"; there is an
opportunity today, which will not last long, for Canada to exploit the informatics
revolution to its own best advantage, and we believe that policies and actions
must begin at once to ensure that the facilities for and content of informatics in
Canada not be allowed to develop on a "branch-plant" basis,
Id at 58.
112. Quoted in CoMPUTING EUROPE, Feb. 2, 1978, at 26.
113. Clyne Committee report, supra note 77, at 77-86.
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trum of economic and social activities. The report recommends that
the Government require data-processing activities related to Cana-
dian business operations to take place in Canada. 114 Local data
processing will, it is hoped, preserve both employment opportunities
and control over Canadian information. 15
The EC, as noted, has from the outset been primarily concerned
with the development of a strong data-processing industry. The EC
Commission has launched a program to capture one third of the
world teleinformatics market by 1990,116 and this, too, properly falls
into the category of an informatics plan. The EC strategy includes
provisions for the following: (1) the standardization of components
used in computing; (2) the removal of nontariff trade barriers
between EC member countries; (3) allowing all companies in the EC
to compete for each member state's governmental contracts;
(4) more money for the research and development of computer and
chip technology as well as better coordination of national research
programs; (5) the establishment of an integrated digital network for
telecommunications so that video systems, computers, and more con-
ventional telecommunications can be linked by the same network
throughout the EC; (6) the reduction of tariffs on components not
manufactured in the EC and a possible increase in tariffs on compo-
nents that are; and (7) studies to set up a teleinformatic network for
the EC institutions.11 7
In a global economy in which exports are critical to national
economic survival, these direct initiatives for the capture of the
global teleinformatics market bode ill for any nation's less aggressive
enterprises. And the EC is not alone. Japan's commercial strategy is
infamous, and France recently announced its goal of exporting fully
thirty percent of French-manufactured telecommunications equip-
ment by 1982.1I s
114. Recommendation 24(b), id at 65, 84. The Clyne Committee also recommended
that the Government stimulate the creation of Canadian-owned data banks, support edu-
cation for programmers and systems analysts, and generally promote the development of
Canada's electronics-manufacturing industry. Recommendations 23, 24(e), 25, id at 63,
65, 73, 84-86. For a description of Canada's success in these endeavors, see N.Y. Times,
May 11, 1981, at DI, col. 4.
115. Clyne Committee report, supra note 77, at 62-64.
116. E.g., Commission of the European Communities, European Society Faced With
the Challenge of New Information Technologies: A Community Response, Doc. COM
(79) 650 final at foreword 1 (1979).
117. ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 1979, at 52. See Ramsey, Europe Responds to the Challenge
of the New Information Technologies: A Teleinformatics Strategyfor the 1980", 14 CoR-
NELL INr't L . 237 (1981).
118. See note 13 supra. The United States market is France's primary target. Id See
generally Stratte-McClure, note 12 supra.
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) Data protection laws and informatics plans are not necessarily
contrary to international harmony. There is, however, a troubling
intellectual enchantment with the concept of a postindustrial, infor-
mation-based economy and society. This preoccupation may lead to
the adoption of unnecessarily restrictive, even counterproductive
information laws, taxes, tariffs, regulations, and policies. Once
adopted, these measures will be difficult to remove or amend and
will ultimately serve to inhibit the more orderly development of the
international communications law and policy so badly needed.
IV
COMPUTER VULNERABILITY
The concern over national computer vulnerability mirrors the
concern over the need for greater privacy protection for the individ-
ual. National governments, like individuals, depend increasingly
upon computers and telecommunications to store and process infor-
mation relating to national agriculture, .ommerce, vital services, and
most notably, nktional defense. Moreover, multinational banks and
others routinely transfer around the globe large volumes of data
essential for governmental use. I t9 The negative impact a country
would sustain in the event of a temporary or sustained denial of
access to such data reveals the extent of its computer vulnerability.
In the United States, the Department of Defense, other agencies
concerned with national security, and numerous defense- and intelli-
gence-oriented think tanks have examined the vulnerability of
United States information systems, but there has been little public
discussion. Elsewhere in the world, only Sweden has published any
substantive work. In 1977, the Swedish Ministry of Defense formed
a committee, the Slrbarhetskommitt (SARK), to investigate the
computer vulnerability of the Swedish society and to propose meas-
ures to reduce this weakness.'20
One particular event did much to prompt the Swedish study. In
an experimental data communications project, information on the
fire hazards of buildings in Malm6, Sweden, including descriptions
of their physical plants, locations, and the nearest fire hydrants, was
recorded in a computer and communicated to the Mal6 fire depart-
119. See, e.g., note 121 infra and accompanying text.
120. SARBARHETSKOMMITTIN, F6RSVARPDEPARTEMENTF, ADB OCH SAMHXLLETS
SARBARHET 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as SARK report] (on file at Cornell International
Law Journal). For a summary in English of the SARK report and a description of the
SARK's subsequent activities, see COMMITrEE ON THE VULNERABILITY OF COMPUTER
SYSTEMS, SWEDISH MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, THE VULNERABILITY OF THE COMPUTER-
IZED SOCIETY (1980) [hereinafter cited as Summary-]eportl (on file at Cornell Interna-
tional Law Journal).
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ment at the sound of an alarm.' 2' The information was stored in a
General Electric computer in Cleveland, Ohio, which led Swedish
politicians and others to speculate about the consequences that
would have ensued, if access to the data base had been impeded.
Despite its sponsorship, the SARK report does not confine its
findings to matters concerning military security. Instead, the report
also categorizes and assesses the risks and pressures implicit in the
general use of computers. Although many of the SARK's percep-
tions are novel, the data protection acts of other nations (primarily
Western European) reflect similar assessments. 122
The report divides vulnerability factors into two main catego-
ries, internal and external factors. Internal factors 23 are those inher-
ent in the use of computers and include the concentration of
computer operations and dependence on assistance from abroad,
e.g., for spare parts. External factors' 24 include war, both political
and economic, terrorism, and crimes against property-which the
SARK suggests may gain an entirely new dimension in an environ-
ment where payment transactions are highly computerized.' 25 The
report assumes that politically motivated acts of terrorism will con-
tinue to increase and that terrorism will become an important con-
sideration in national planning.' 26 The report also argues that
Sweden's dependence on international data transmission circuits
makes Sweden vulnerable to the political instability of each country
through which these circuits pass.
127
The SARK report uses worst case analyses, including military
attack;' 28 the enemy capture of citizen information registers;1 29 the
destruction or damage of computers and communications systems by
the electromagnetic pulse effect of nuclear explosions; 30 and natural
catastrophes affecting domestic and foreign data bases on which the
country depends. 13' The study considers, among others, registers
containing information on banking, 3 2 inventory,' 33 and production
processes.' 34 In Sweden, government functions as a great storehouse
121. SARK report, supra note 120, at 246-47.
122. Summary report, supra note 120, at 14.
123. SARK, report, supra note 120, at 12-17, 163-249.
124. Id at 7-17, 120-62.
125. Id at 8.
126. Id at 7-8, 32-33, 125-29.
127. Id at 8-9, 133-42.
128. Id at 143-56.
129. Id at 163-71.
130. Id at 19, 154-56, 257.
131. Id at 157-62.
132. Id at 86-90.
133. Id at 84-86.
134. Id at 80-83.
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ofpersonal and commercial information, including information of a
confidential and strategic nature such as descriptions of the internal
operations of private enterprises and population registers that list
places of residence. The SARK report contends that all this infor-
mation could be used to exert undesirable pressure were it to fall
into the wrong hands.135 It comes as no surprise, then, that the
SARK recommends that Sweden include the Data Inspection Board
among the authorities with responsibility for the vulnerability ques-
tion. 136 The Committee would award to the Board the primary
responsibility for licensing, supervising, and examining all data
bases. 137
Other aspects of vulnerability include the functional concentra-
tion of some computer systems138 and the awesome synthesizing
capabilities of data-processing technology. 139 Both characteristics
would greatly facilitate the assimilation for harmful purposes of dis-
parate and otherwise banal information. The SARK report cites
even dependence on a small group of key data-processing personnel
as an instance of vulnerability.140 The. Committee notes that such a
group might belome an enemy target 41 and that a work stoppage by
it alone could lend powerful leverage in a much larger labor
dispute.142
The multifariousness and the severity of the national computer
vulnerability described by the Committee add force to its call for
effective emergency preparedness. 43 The Committee links computer
vulnerability to informatics and economics when it implicitly recom-
mends the development of a national computer industry to reduce
the vulnerability created by dependence on assistance from
abroad. 144 The increased use of better encryption methods is one of
the more important recommendations, to be implemented first at the
data link, but eventually at the data register itself.
145
Because it may be of influence outside Sweden,146 the SARK's
135. Id at 163-87.
136. Summary report, supra note 120, at 19.
137. Id
138. SARK report, supra note 120, at 14, 188-93.
139. Id at 15, 203-06.
140. Id at 16-17, 219-26.
141. Id at 17, 223-24.
142. Id at 17, 224-25.
143. Id at 19-20, 231-35, 256-58.
144. Summary report, supra note 120, at 13. See a/so SARK report, supra note 120, at
18, 236-49, 252.
145. Summary report, supra note 123, at 13. See also SARK report, supra note 120, at
117.
146. See, e.g., Clyne Committee report, supra note 77, at 60.
Computer vulnerability is clearly not a problem peculiar to countries dependent on
foreign data bases and other assistance from abroad. Terrorist sabotage, for instance,
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recommendation of pervasive licensing 47 should cause some con-
cern in the United States private sector. The proposed licensing
scheme would require the disclosure of register content, system
structure, security measures, dependence on staff, mechanical and
manual standby routines, emergency planning, integration with and
dependence on other data-processing systems, and the geographical
location and so-called suitability of data-processing operations
abroad.1 48 Both register content 149 and data-processing operations
abroad 150 would be subject to restriction. Such restrictions would
apply to both personal and other data, but would not apply uni-
formly to the public and private sectors.15' A governmental agency
would be responsible for disposing of the information disclosed.'
52
The SARK has already drafted enabling legislation, entitled the
Vulnerability Act, that speaks to the proposed licensing proce-
dure. 153 The Committee recommends the postponement of any
action on the Vulnerability Act or similar measures until the Gov-
ernment and the Parliament have defined their positions vis-a-vis the
Committee's proposals.1 54
In the United States, computer vulnerability and related sub-
jects have traditionally been considered matters of national security.
Consequently, they have remained nearly exclusively within the
domain of the military and intelligence communities, primarily the
National Security Agency. There is a growing need, however, to
include members of the commercial sector and the public as partici-
pants in the discussion of computer and communications security.
Often the requirements of business, whether legal or economic, con-
flict with the responsibility of the state to protect its secrets, which
now include information about the nation's agricultural and intellec-
threatens the computer systems of the United States as much as it threatens those of
Sweden. See SARK report, supra note 120, at 125-29. In a rare discussion of this sensi-
tive topic, the then Director of the U.S. National Security Agency stated that "[t]here is a
growing recognition of the potential vulnerability of our communications system writhin
the United States to exploitation, both by foreign powers and by domestic law-breakers."
Address by B.R. Inman, Vital Telecommunications Issues Symposium, U.S. Dep't. of
State (Jan. 1979), printed in SIGNAL, Mar. 1979, at 6, 8 [hereinafter cited as Inman
Address].
147. Summary report, supra note 120, at 16-18. See also SAkRK report, supra note
120, at 261-64, app. I.
148. Summary report, supra note 120, at 16.
149. Id See also SARK report, supra note 120, at 255-56.
150. Summary report, supra note 120, at 16. See also SARK report, supra note 120, at
252, 262.
151. Summary report, supra note 120, at 17.
152. See notes 136-37 supra and accompanying text.
153. Summary report, supra note 120, at 16.
154. Id
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tual resources as well as more conventional secrets. 55 At present,
the conflict centers on the technical standard for encryption.
156
The United States National Bureau of Standards has developed
the so-called Data Encryption Standard to serve as the standard for
protection by encryption of information in computers purchased or
used by the Federal Government.1 57 The Data Encryption Standard
is also available to businesses for their confidential data. 15 8 Increas-
ingly, private entities, particularly banks and insurance companies,
must protect transmitted data by using encryption. Research sup-
porting the cryptographic needs of both the private and the public
sectors have been prolific, and grants from the National Science
Foundation have supplied part of the necessary financing. Although
the National Security Agency denied, in 1979, any involvement,
159
there is growing recognition that the Agency is restricting these
grants160 and, furthermore, that the Agency may seek to wrest from
the National Science Foundation the authority to award them. 16'
The Agency apparently fears that increased private, academic (and
therefore published) cryptographic research will contribute to the
development abroad of sophisticated cryptographic technology.
Furthermore, this sophistication might render United States security
techniques more vulnerable, a possibility that led the Director of the
Agency to declare that "unrestrained nongovernmental cryptologic
activity poses a threat to national security."
162
The defense and business communities are also divided over the
role national security has to play regarding trade and the transfer of
technology, particularly as.these concern the Communist countries.
The United States Government often restricts these transfers
severely on the ground that they would pose a threat to national
security by aiding the military operations of a hostile power.'
63
Others maintain, however, that foreign suppliers step into the breach
155. Walter B. Wriston, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citibank, cites encryp-
tion as an example. He notes that some governments encourage the use of encryption by
private communicators to protect privacy, while other governments, for reasons of
national security, prohibit this use. In addition, he notes that emerging regulations for
the security of nonpersonal data bases may imperil the private use of encryption, because
regulators will have to know the content of the files they seek to protect. Letter of Walter
B. Wriston, note 55 supra.
156. See N.Y. Times, June 1, 1981, at A14, col. 1.
157. Inman Address, supra note 146, at 8-9. See also U.S. NEws & WoRLD REPORT,
June 26, 1978, at 45, 48.
158. U.S. Nnws & WORLD REPORT, supra note 157, at 48.
159. Inman Address, supra note 146, at 9.
160. Wash. Post, Aug. 28, 1980, at A9, col. 1. See 208 SCIENCE 1442 (1980).
161. 210 SCIENCE 511 (1980).
162. Inman Address, supra note 146, at 13.
163. Norris, High Technology Trade With the Communists, DATAMATION, Jan. 1978, at
99. See, e.g., Electronic News, Oct. 8, 1979, at 6, col. I.
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created by governmental prohibitions of the transfer of technology
from United States corporations. 64 The upshot, they argue, is
merely lost jobs in the United States.165 We need to fashion a more
refined formula for balancing political and economic security across
a broader spectrum of vulnerability concerns.
V
NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INFORMATION
Sovereignty in its fullest sense is the "supreme, absolute, and
uncontrollable power by which any independent state is governed
.... "166 Many nations, or at least their prominent national leaders,
increasingly invoke the term sovereignty when discussing informa-
tion issues. 1 67 They fear that sophisticated computer and telecom-
munications technology may bring about a general loss of national
independence or autonomy.
68
Sweden, as noted, has examined the ways in which information
technology has undermined its national security. 169 Canada has
adopted a very broad definition of sovereignty: "'the ability of
Canadians [both in government and in the private sector] to exercise
control over the . . . direction of economic, social, cultural, and
political change.' ",170 By using this expansive definition, the Clyne
Committee was able to employ the concept of sovereignty to justi
fy even recommendations concerning foreign programming on
Canadian television. 17' Potentially more significant, some develop-
ing countries argue that so-called electronic colonialism or electronic
imperialism compromise their cultural and political integrity. These
stirring phrases also express perceived threats to national
sovereignty.
The international resolution of information issues, especially in
the area of earth-sensing technology, may eventually expand the
accepted legal meaning of sovereignty. Charges of electronic coloni-
alism may sound extreme, but they are often accompanied by the
164. E.g., Electronic News, Oct. 8, 1979, at 6, col. 1.
165. E.g., Norris, note 166 supra.
166. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1252 (5th ed. 1979). Professor Starke suggests that
this definition of sovereignty is anachronistic: "[I]t is probably more accurate today to
say that the sovereignty of a State means the residuum of power which it possesses within
the confines laid down by international law." J. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 113 (8th ed. 1977).
167. See, e.g., Clyne Committee report, supra note 77, at 1-9, 30-31, 41-42, 63-65, 75-
76, 79; Address of F.A. Bernasconi, supra note 21,prinfedin 3 TRANSNAT'L DATA REP.
No. 3/4, at 4.
168. See, e.g., note 11 supra and accompanying text.
169. See notes 120-54 supra and accompanying text
170. Clyne Committee report, supra note 77, at 1.
171. Id at 37-46, 80-82.
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more reasonable assertion that the primary finders and developers of
the world's nonrenewable resources enjoy enviable advantages in the
mounting struggle to acquire dwindling resources. 172 According to
the Clyne Committee's analysis, in which the developing countries
increasingly concur, there will be two classes of people and nations
in the information age: the exploiters and the exploited. 173 The
developing countries are anxious lest the slower pace of their devel-
opment ultimately preclude them from ever establishing high tech-
nology industries and services of their own. They fear both the
exhaustion of vital, limited resources, including the communications
spectra, 174 and the practical impossibility of new market entry by the
time they are capable of pursuing high technology.
175
Earth-sensing technology is an important tool in finding the
world's resources. Some argue that the users of this technology
achieve unfair advantages by "wresting information about areas
from those who have a first claim on such knowledge-the inhabi-
tants of the area."'176 Consequently, some countries have begun to
suggest that information itself is a natural resource over which
nations may exercise permanent sovereignty. 177 If this principle
becomes established, it may develop that sensing nations will have to
acquire the consent of sensed nations before earth sensing can be
undertaken.17 8 The United States has not recognized the validity of
172. H. Schiller, Planetary Resource Information Flows: A New Dimension of Hege-
monic Power, or Global Social Utility? (unpublished paper presented at Conference on
World Communications: Decisions for the Eighties, Annenberg School of Communica-
tions, University of Pennsylvania, May 12-14, 1980) (on file at Cornell Internationai Law
Journal).
173. Clyne Committee report, supra note 77, at 58.
174. See generally ACADEMY FOR EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, THE UNITED
STATES AND THE DEBATE ON THE WORLD "INFORMATION ORDER!' 36-42 (1978); PANEL
ON INT'L TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INT'L LAW,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION
UNION: ISSUES AND NExT STEPS 6-13 (1971).
175. See, e.g., Address by Joubert de Oliviera Brizida, supra note 8, printed in 3
TRANSNAT'L DATA REP. No. 3/4, at 32, 33-34 (1980).
176. H. Schiller, supra note 172, at 4.
177. See, e.g., Treaty on Remote Sensing of Natural Resources by Means of Space
Technology-Draft Basic Articles in Letter from the Permanent Representatives of
Argentina and Brazil to the Secretary General (Oct. 15, 1974), reprinted in First Commit-
tee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/C.l/1047
(1974). The fifth preambulary paragraph of the draft treaty cites two United Nations
General Assembly resolutions concerning sovereignty and natural resources: Permanent
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 2158 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
16) 29, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); and Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources,
G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
First Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra, at 2.
178. Article V of the draft Treaty on Remote Sensing of Natural Resources by Means
of Space Technology provides as follows: "States parties shall refrain from undertaking
activities of remote sensing of natural resources belonging to another State party, includ-
ing the resources located in maritime areas under national jurisdiction, without the con-
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sovereignty claims of this type. 179 Some developing countries have
taken a completely different approach. These nations insist that
national sovereignty extends spacially to those parts of outer space
where earth-sensing satellites orbit. 180 Again, if sovereignty is
extended to cover these orbits, the legitimacy of prior consent restric-
tions would presumably follow.
In a more general sense, nations may employ the principles of
sovereignty in order to justify the introduction of new, abrasive
information laws and practices. The concept of sovereignty is uni-
versally respected; therefore, it is difficult to protest actions under-
taken in its name, regardless of the suspected motive. Sovereignty
may, for instance, provide a nation that seeks a period of neoisola-
tionism with an internationally respected shibboleth for drawing an
information curtain about itself.181 Some have invoked national
sovereignty in the effort to establish the so-called New World Infor-
mation Order. 182 If nations succeed in requiring foreign journalists
to submit news reports for an assessment of balance and so-called
responsibility, their governments may gain a powerful tool for inter-
national propaganda. 8 3 Moreover, if prior consent requirements
become established under this rationale, nations might easily extend
them to cover the transborder transmission of all information,
including commercial data.
If freedom of speech and freedom of the press are to remain
unimpaired, there is a clear need to examine the character of the
information subjected to prior consent restrictions. Prior consent
regulations may severely inhibit these freedoms in nations that adopt
these regulations. Moreover, they may weaken the effectiveness of
these freedoms in nations that decline to enact prior consent legisla-
tion. Thus, ideational information should transit freely. Only infor-
mation properly characterized as a commodity should be subject to
trade negotiations, taxes, customs duties, and if necessary, prior con-
sent regulations. Even if nations accept this basic distinction, tech-
nological advances may only exacerbate the problem. As
communications technology drives toward the total digitalization of
sent of the latter." First Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, supra note 177, at 3.
179. H. Schiller, supra note 172, at 5.
180. See, eg., Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SI.277, at 2-4 (1977).
181. See generally Wash. Post, Dec. 10, 1980, at A31, col. 3; id, Aug. 24, 1980, at Al,
col 4.
182. See, eg., INT'L COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS, MANY
VOICES ONE WORLD 143 (1980).
183. See N.Y. Times, May 18, 1981, at Al, col. I.
19811
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communications, the discrimination of content in pictures, data,
voice, graphics, and news will become increasingly difficult.
Of course, censorship has a long history. If, however, the inter-
national community accepts as legitimate the invocation of sover-
eignty in relation to information issues, the consequences may entail
more than expanded censorship. The absolute nature of sovereignty
may render information issues less amenable to resolution by inter-
national agreement and practice. Governments will have a new
ground for scrutinizing the practices and agreements of private par-
ties. Arbitrary governmental actions on information matters will not
be proper subjects for protest by other governments.
Informatics plans in some respects resemble these assertions of
sovereignty, but the motivation behind these plans is essentially eco-
nomic. If an informatics plan sets as its goal the capture of the world
market in the provision of telecommunications services, the plan
necessarily contemplates greater international interdependence. The
increased invocation of sovereignty in reference to information mat-
ters threatens reduced international interdependence.
VI
THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION POLICY
Transborder data flow restrictions pose perhaps the greatest
threat to the United States, where the communications revolution is
most advanced. Yet, because its private sector is diverse and its pub-
lic sector ever more fragmented, the United States is poorly organ-
ized for dealing decisively with the rapidly unfolding problems of
transborder data flow. A number of governmental agencies and
offices, too many, share authority for international communications
and information issues. After a comprehensive examination of the
myriad of issues, the House Committee on Government Operations
reached the same conclusion:194
The governments of our major trading partners and of the developing
world are adopting national policies and comprehensive plans to respond to
problems brought about by advances in computer and telecommunications
technologies. They view these problems in a spectrum ranging from adver-
tising and television broadcasting, to the use of data processing for keeping
records and accounts, to the growth of data communications. They see the
international flow of information through telecommunications systems, par-
ticularly computer to computer communications, as a major cause for con-
cern and a basis for governmental action. Out of this concern for the effects
184. The Report of the Committee on Government Operations is based on a study
made by the Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights. Letter
from Jack Brooks to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (Dec. 11, 1980), reprinted in 1980 House
Report, supra note-,at--IIl:
TEL EINFO MA TICS
of the changing character of the international flow of information, several
nations have taken actions creating barriers to that flow.
In the face of these developments, the U.S. Government is unprepared.
It has developed neither comprehensive plans or policies nor a coherent
strategy for responding to the policies of other nations which may damage
U.S. interests. The U.S. Government does not have even the organizational
structure to develop such policies, coordinate its actions, and effectively pro-
tect U.S. interestsY185
The House Committee recommended the creation of a Cabinet
level Council on International Communications and Information.
186
The proposed Council would be composed of an independent direc-
tor, the Secretaries of State and Commerce, the Chairman of the
Federal Communications Commission, the United States Trade
Representative, the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, and the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs.187 The proposed Council's principal responsibility would be
"to coordinate development and implementation of a uniform, con-
sistent, and comprehensive United States policy in response to the
problems raised by barriers to international communications and
information flow.'
1 88
The proposed Council would serve as a coordinator within the
Government and between the Government and the private sector:
The Council should serve as the office to which private sector problems and
concerns can be brought and from which responsibility may be delegated to
appropriate agencies.
* * * An advisory committee, patterned after the advisory committees for
trade negotiations and composed of representatives of the private sector-
including manufacturers, providers, and users of international communica-
tions and information products and services-should be established to pro-
vide policy guidance to the Council.
* * * An inter-agency committee should be established to advise the
Council with respect to problems of international communications and infor-
mation transfer which Federal agencies encounter in the performance of
their duties.
189
Because information issues so pervade the United States' econ-
omy and society, the House Committee decided that no single gov-
ernmental agency could serve as the sole source of wisdom in
providing solutions. Accordingly, the Committee would grant the
proposed Council a limited life during which it would act as a cata-
lyst and provide an initial policy overview. 190 The real work of solv-
ing teleinformatics problems would be left for the various
185. 1980 House Report, supra note 6, at 1-2.
186. Id at 10, 56.
187. Id at 10-11, 56.
188. Id at 56.
189. Id at 11, 56.
190. Id at 10, 56.
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departments and agencies with primary authority. Whether the
House Committee's organizational concept is widely embraced or
not, the need for a national communications and information policy
is finally gaining recognition.
CONCLUSION
Taken together, these challenges to the United States assume
immense proportions. Moreover, the solutions do not rest with the
United States alone. We should consider refurbishing and perhaps
restructuring the fora of world government to accommodate the
pressures developing over information as a resource. Any change
will undoubtedly require considerable humility on the part of the
United States or any other major player. We at least need to seek
international agreement on subjects ranging from the compatibility
of equipment to the confidentiality and security of communicated
information. International regulation is inevitable. The only ques-
tion is whether this regulation is good or bad, well planned or cum-
bersome in its conception.
This dimension of our foreign relations offers a challenge to our
idealism and our ingenuity, our sense of mission and our common
sense. It is the challenge of the last quarter of this century.
